COMPANIES ACT 2016 - Control of the Composition of the Board of Directors — Section 4(2) 《2016 年公司法》控制董事会的组成
COMPANIES ACT 2016
(2) For the purposes of subparagraph (1)(a)(i), the composition of a corporation’s board of directors shall be deemed to be controlled by another corporation if that other corporation can appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors and for the purposes of this provision, the holding company shall be deemed to have the power to make such an appointment if—
(a) a person cannot be appointed as a director without the exercise of such a power in his favour by that other corporation; or
(b) a person’s appointment as a director follows necessarily from his being a director or other officer of that other corporation.
Control of the Composition of the Board of Directors — Section 4(2)
Section 4(2) of the Companies Act 2016 explains when one corporation is regarded as controlling the composition of the board of directors of another corporation for the purposes of section 4(1)(a)(i).
Under section 4(1)(a)(i), a corporation may be deemed to be a subsidiary of another corporation where that other corporation controls the composition of its board. Section 4(2) provides the test for determining when such board control exists.
A corporation is deemed to control the composition of another corporation's board where it has the power to appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors.
In practical terms, the relevant question is whether the other corporation possesses sufficient power over the appointment or removal of directors to determine who controls the board.
Power to Appoint or Remove All or a Majority of Directors
The principal test under section 4(2) is whether the other corporation can:
This is important because control over a majority of the board ordinarily provides the ability to influence or determine the management and strategic direction of the corporation, even where majority share ownership may not exist.
Section 4(2) further specifies two circumstances in which the holding company is deemed to possess the power to make such appointments.
(a) Appointment Requires the Exercise of the Other Corporation's Power
A holding company is deemed to have the power to appoint a director where a person cannot be appointed as a director unless the other corporation exercises a power in that person's favour.
In other words, if the appointment of a director depends upon the approval, nomination, consent, or exercise of an appointment right by the other corporation, that corporation is treated as possessing the relevant appointment power for the purposes of determining board control.
The substance of the appointment mechanism is therefore important. The question is not merely who formally appoints the director, but whether the appointment could occur without the exercise of the other corporation's power.
(b) Appointment Arising from Office in the Other Corporation
The holding company is also deemed to have the power of appointment where a person's appointment as a director of the corporation necessarily follows from that person being a director or other officer of the other corporation.
For example, assume the governing arrangements of Corporation B provide that certain directors of Corporation A automatically become directors of Corporation B by virtue of holding their positions in Corporation A.
If those appointments necessarily arise because the individuals are directors or officers of Corporation A, Corporation A is deemed to possess the relevant appointment power for the purposes of section 4(2).
This prevents board control from being disguised through automatic or ex officio appointment arrangements.
Relationship with Section 4(1)
Sections 4(1)(a)(i) and 4(2) should be read together.
The relationship can be summarised as follows:
Step 1 — Determine appointment or removal power
Does Corporation A have the power to appoint or remove all or a majority of Corporation B's directors?
Step 2 — Consider deemed appointment powers
Even where Corporation A does not directly make the formal appointment, does:
If the statutory test is satisfied, Corporation A is deemed to control the composition of Corporation B's board.
Step 4 — Determine subsidiary status
Subject to the other provisions of section 4, Corporation B may consequently be deemed a subsidiary of Corporation A under section 4(1)(a)(i).
Practical Example
Assume Corporation A owns only 40% of the shares in Corporation B.
Corporation B has five directors. Under an agreement or its governing arrangements, Corporation A has the power to appoint three of those five directors.
Although Corporation A does not hold more than half of Corporation B's shares, it has the power to appoint a majority of Corporation B's board.
Corporation A may therefore be regarded as controlling the composition of Corporation B's board under section 4(2). Consequently, subject to the remaining provisions of section 4, Corporation B may be deemed to be a subsidiary of Corporation A under section 4(1)(a)(i).
This illustrates why subsidiary status cannot be determined solely by examining the percentage of shares held.
Practical Significance
Section 4(2) is particularly important when reviewing corporate structures involving:
(2) For the purposes of subparagraph (1)(a)(i), the composition of a corporation’s board of directors shall be deemed to be controlled by another corporation if that other corporation can appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors and for the purposes of this provision, the holding company shall be deemed to have the power to make such an appointment if—
(a) a person cannot be appointed as a director without the exercise of such a power in his favour by that other corporation; or
(b) a person’s appointment as a director follows necessarily from his being a director or other officer of that other corporation.
Control of the Composition of the Board of Directors — Section 4(2)
Section 4(2) of the Companies Act 2016 explains when one corporation is regarded as controlling the composition of the board of directors of another corporation for the purposes of section 4(1)(a)(i).
Under section 4(1)(a)(i), a corporation may be deemed to be a subsidiary of another corporation where that other corporation controls the composition of its board. Section 4(2) provides the test for determining when such board control exists.
A corporation is deemed to control the composition of another corporation's board where it has the power to appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors.
In practical terms, the relevant question is whether the other corporation possesses sufficient power over the appointment or removal of directors to determine who controls the board.
The principal test under section 4(2) is whether the other corporation can:
- appoint all of the directors;
- remove all of the directors;
- appoint a majority of the directors; or
- remove a majority of the directors.
This is important because control over a majority of the board ordinarily provides the ability to influence or determine the management and strategic direction of the corporation, even where majority share ownership may not exist.
Section 4(2) further specifies two circumstances in which the holding company is deemed to possess the power to make such appointments.
(a) Appointment Requires the Exercise of the Other Corporation's Power
A holding company is deemed to have the power to appoint a director where a person cannot be appointed as a director unless the other corporation exercises a power in that person's favour.
In other words, if the appointment of a director depends upon the approval, nomination, consent, or exercise of an appointment right by the other corporation, that corporation is treated as possessing the relevant appointment power for the purposes of determining board control.
The substance of the appointment mechanism is therefore important. The question is not merely who formally appoints the director, but whether the appointment could occur without the exercise of the other corporation's power.
(b) Appointment Arising from Office in the Other Corporation
The holding company is also deemed to have the power of appointment where a person's appointment as a director of the corporation necessarily follows from that person being a director or other officer of the other corporation.
For example, assume the governing arrangements of Corporation B provide that certain directors of Corporation A automatically become directors of Corporation B by virtue of holding their positions in Corporation A.
If those appointments necessarily arise because the individuals are directors or officers of Corporation A, Corporation A is deemed to possess the relevant appointment power for the purposes of section 4(2).
This prevents board control from being disguised through automatic or ex officio appointment arrangements.
Sections 4(1)(a)(i) and 4(2) should be read together.
The relationship can be summarised as follows:
Step 1 — Determine appointment or removal power
Does Corporation A have the power to appoint or remove all or a majority of Corporation B's directors?
Step 2 — Consider deemed appointment powers
Even where Corporation A does not directly make the formal appointment, does:
- the appointment require Corporation A to exercise a power in favour of the proposed director; or
- the appointment necessarily follow from the person's position as a director or officer of Corporation A?
If the statutory test is satisfied, Corporation A is deemed to control the composition of Corporation B's board.
Step 4 — Determine subsidiary status
Subject to the other provisions of section 4, Corporation B may consequently be deemed a subsidiary of Corporation A under section 4(1)(a)(i).
Assume Corporation A owns only 40% of the shares in Corporation B.
Corporation B has five directors. Under an agreement or its governing arrangements, Corporation A has the power to appoint three of those five directors.
Although Corporation A does not hold more than half of Corporation B's shares, it has the power to appoint a majority of Corporation B's board.
Corporation A may therefore be regarded as controlling the composition of Corporation B's board under section 4(2). Consequently, subject to the remaining provisions of section 4, Corporation B may be deemed to be a subsidiary of Corporation A under section 4(1)(a)(i).
This illustrates why subsidiary status cannot be determined solely by examining the percentage of shares held.
Section 4(2) is particularly important when reviewing corporate structures involving:
- shareholders' agreements containing director nomination or appointment rights;
- joint ventures;
- special classes of shares carrying director appointment rights;
- corporate constitutions containing board nomination provisions;
- nominee directors;
- automatic or ex officio directorships;
- corporate restructuring arrangements; and
- groups where control exists without majority share ownership.
《2016 年公司法》
第4(2)条——控制董事会的组成
就第4(1)(a)(i)条而言，如果另一法人团体（Corporation）能够委任或罢免该法人团体的全部或过半数董事，则该法人团体董事会的组成应被视为受到该另一法人团体的控制。
就本条文而言，在以下任何一种情况下，该**控股公司（Holding Company）**应被视为拥有作出有关董事委任的权力：
(a)如某人士若没有该另一法人团体为其利益行使有关权力，便无法获委任为董事；或
(b)某人士获委任为董事，是其担任该另一法人团体的**董事或其他高级人员（Other Officer）**所必然产生的结果。
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控制董事会组成——第4(2)条
《2016年公司法令》第4(2)条说明，就第4(1)(a)(i)条而言，在何种情况下，一个法人团体会被视为控制另一法人团体董事会的组成（Controlling the Composition of the Board of Directors）。
根据第4(1)(a)(i)条，如果一个法人团体的董事会组成受到另一法人团体控制，则前者可被视为后者的附属公司（Subsidiary）。
第4(2)条进一步规定了判断是否存在该等**董事会控制（Board Control）**的法定测试。
如果一个法人团体有权：
• 委任另一法人团体的全部董事；
• 罢免另一法人团体的全部董事；
• 委任另一法人团体过半数的董事；或
• 罢免另一法人团体过半数的董事，
则该法人团体即被视为控制另一法人团体董事会的组成。
从实务角度而言，关键问题在于：另一法人团体是否拥有足够的董事委任权或罢免权，从而能够决定董事会的组成及控制权。
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委任或罢免全部或过半数董事的权力
第4(2)条的主要测试，是确定另一法人团体是否能够委任或罢免该法人团体全部或过半数董事。
只要存在该项权力，该法人团体董事会的组成即被视为受到另一法人团体控制。
此项规定十分重要，因为控制董事会过半数席位，通常意味着控制方能够对公司的：
• 管理事务；
• 商业决策；
• 企业管治；
• 重大政策；以及
• 策略方向
产生重大甚至决定性的影响，即使该控制方本身并未持有超过50%的股份。
第4(2)条进一步规定了两种情况，在这些情况下，控股公司将被依法视为拥有有关董事的委任权。
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(a) 董事委任必须依赖另一法人团体行使权力
如果某人士若没有另一法人团体为其利益行使某项权力，便无法获委任为董事，则该另一法人团体应被视为拥有委任该董事的权力。
换言之，如果某人士获委任为董事必须依赖另一法人团体作出：
• 批准（Approval）；
• 提名（Nomination）；
• 同意（Consent）；或
• 行使其他董事委任权，
则就判断董事会控制权而言，该另一法人团体将被视为拥有相关的董事委任权。
因此，法律着重的是委任机制的实际性质及法律效果，而不仅仅是最终由谁在形式上签署或作出董事委任。
关键问题是：
如果另一法人团体不行使其权力，该人士是否仍然能够获委任为董事？
如果答案是否定的，则另一法人团体可能被视为拥有该董事的委任权。
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(b) 因担任另一法人团体职务而必然获委任
如果某人士获委任为某法人团体的董事，是由于该人士担任另一法人团体的董事或其他高级人员而必然产生的结果，则该另一法人团体亦被视为拥有有关董事的委任权。
例如：
假设 **B法人团体（Corporation B）**的公司章程或其他管治安排规定：
A法人团体（Corporation A）的某些董事，将因其在A法人团体所担任的职位而自动成为B法人团体的董事。
如果有关人士成为B法人团体董事，是其担任A法人团体董事或高级人员的必然结果，则：
A法人团体将被视为拥有有关董事的委任权。
此项规定可防止企业透过所谓的：
• 自动委任（Automatic Appointment）；或
• 当然职务委任（Ex Officio Appointment）
等安排，掩盖实际存在的董事会控制关系。
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与第4(1)条的关系
第4(1)(a)(i)条与第4(2)条应结合起来理解及适用。
整个判断过程可概括如下：
第一步——确定董事委任或罢免权
首先判断：
A法人团体是否有权委任或罢免B法人团体的全部或过半数董事？
如有，则可能构成董事会控制。
第二步——考虑法定视为拥有的委任权
即使A法人团体并非形式上直接作出董事委任，仍须进一步考虑：
• 有关董事的委任是否必须由A法人团体为该人士行使某项权力后才能完成；或
• 有关董事的委任是否因该人士担任A法人团体的董事或其他高级人员而必然产生。
若符合其中任何一种情况，A法人团体仍可被视为拥有相关董事的委任权。
第三步——判断是否控制董事会组成
如果上述法定测试得到满足，则：
A法人团体被视为控制B法人团体董事会的组成。
第四步——判断附属公司身份
在符合第4条其他规定的情况下：
B法人团体可依据第4(1)(a)(i)条被视为A法人团体的附属公司。
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实务示例
假设：
A法人团体仅持有B法人团体40%的股份。
B法人团体共有5名董事。
根据股东协议、公司章程或其他具有法律效力的管治安排，A法人团体有权委任其中3名董事。
由于3名董事构成5人董事会的过半数，因此：
• A法人团体虽然仅持有B法人团体40%的股份；
• A法人团体并未持有B法人团体超过一半的股份；
• 但A法人团体拥有委任B法人团体董事会过半数董事的权力。
因此，根据第4(2)条，A法人团体可能被视为控制B法人团体董事会的组成。
进一步而言，在符合第4条其他适用规定的情况下，B法人团体可依据第4(1)(a)(i)条被视为A法人团体的附属公司。
此例说明：
判断一个法人团体是否属于另一法人团体的附属公司，不能仅依据持股比例作出决定。
董事会控制权同样可以独立构成附属公司关系。
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实务上的重要性
第4(2)条在分析以下企业架构或安排时尤其重要：
• 包含董事提名权或委任权的股东协议（Shareholders' Agreements）；
• 合资企业（Joint Ventures）；
• 附带董事委任权的特殊类别股份；
• 公司章程中有关董事提名或委任的条款；
• 代名董事（Nominee Directors）安排；
• 自动董事委任安排；
• 当然职务董事（Ex Officio Directors）安排；
• 企业重组（Corporate Restructuring）；以及
• 不具有多数股权但实际上拥有控制权的企业集团架构。
因此，在判断一个法人团体是否控制另一法人团体时，不应仅审查其持股结构（Shareholding Structure），还应审查：
• 公司章程（Constitution）；
• 股东协议（Shareholders' Agreements）；
• 董事提名权；
• 董事委任权；
• 董事罢免权；
• 特殊类别股份所附权利；以及
• 其他影响董事会组成的协议或安排。
Aug 07,2026